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— OVERTURE ‘There’s	   a	   bright	   golden	   haze	   on	   the	  meadow,	   there’s	   a	   bright	   golden	   haze	   on	   the	  meadow.’	   So	   begin	   the	   opening	   lines	   of	  Oklahoma,	   the	   1943	  Richard	   Rodgers	   and	  Oscar	   Hammerstein	   musical	   that	   is	   widely	   credited	   as	   the	   first	   full-­‐blown	   ‘book	  musical’.	   The	   original	   Broadway	   production	   ran	   for	   an	   astonishing	   2212	  performances,	   and	   the	   play	  was	   adapted	   into	   an	   Academy	   Award-­‐winning	   film	   in	  1955,	  during	  the	  height	  of	   the	  Cold	  War.	  The	  Oklahoma	  Territory	  portrayed	   in	   the	  Rodgers	   and	   Hammerstein	   musical	   was	   riven	   by	   conflicts	   between	   farmer	   and	  cowman.	   Could	   these	   rivals	   become	   friends?	   Yes!	   They	   can!	   Peace	   and	   social	  harmony	  win	  out,	  and	  the	  community	  forged	  by	  play’s	  end	  shines	  as	  golden-­‐bright	  as	  the	  Oklahoma	  sun.	  And	  yet,	  the	  histories	  of	  so	  many	  are	  left	  off-­‐stage,	  out	  of	  view.	  
Oklahoma	   sanitises	   the	   story	   of	   American	   expansion,	   presenting	   a	   liberal	   fable	   of	  democratic	   harmony	   bursting	   forth	   amidst	   social	   difference.1	   The	   violent	   death	   of	  ‘Pore	   Jud	  Fry’	   is	  but	   an	  afterthought,	   the	  man	  who	  killed	  him	  quickly	   acquitted	   so	  that	  he	  can	  enjoy	  his	  honeymoon	  with	  his	  new	  bride.	  As	  for	  the	  violent	  displacement	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of	  Native	  Americans	   into	   and	   from	   the	   ‘unassigned	   lands’	   that	   became	  Oklahoma?	  Within	   the	   musical	   world	   of	   Oklahoma,	   it	   is	   no	   thought	   at	   all.	   Ultimately,	   the	  beautiful	   American	   morning	   the	   show	   celebrates	   requires	   setting	   some	   others	  beyond	  the	  pale.	  Although	  Oklahoma	  may	  not	  be	  accurate	  as	  history,	  its	  exclusions,	  the	  stories	  it	  does	  not	  or	  cannot	  tell,	  nonetheless	  testify	  to	  the	  failures	  of	  liberal	  tolerance	  to	  make	  room	   for	  wider	   forms	  of	   social	   difference.	  Making	   social	   space	   for	   difference	  does	  not	  mean	   that	   everyone	  has	   to	  be	   friends.	   Indeed,	   the	  widening	   I	  will	   argue	   for	   in	  this	  essay	  both	  requires	  and	  produces	  an	  agonistic	  public	  square.	  This	  is	  democracy	  as	  discomfort.	  However,	  democracy	  does	  not	  require	  that	  we	  agree	  with	  each	  other,	  let	   alone	   like	   each	   other.	   As	   recent	   events	   in	   the	   real-­‐life	   Oklahoma	   suggest,	  agonistic	  democratic	  pluralism	  is	  an	  unfinished	  project.	  
 —‘SAVE OUR STATE’	  In	   November	   2010,	   voters	   in	   the	   state	   of	   Oklahoma	   overwhelmingly	   approved	   a	  ballot	   measure	   that	   bans	   judges	   from	   ‘considering	   or	   using	   Shariah	   Law’	   when	  making	   a	   ruling.	   State	   Question	   755—also	   known	   as	   SQ	   755,	   the	   Shariah	  Amendment,	   the	   Oklahoma	   International	   Law	   Amendment	   and,	   most	  apocalyptically,	   the	   ‘Save	  Our	   State’	   Amendment—garnered	   the	   support	   of	   70	   per	  cent	   of	   voters.	   In	   addition	   to	   amending	   the	   state	   constitution	   to	   ban	   judicial	  consideration	   of	   Shariah	   law,	   the	  measure	   also	  more	   broadly	   forbids	   courts	   from	  ‘considering	  or	  using	  international	  law’.	  This	  coupling	  of	  Shariah	   law	  and	   international	   law	  requires	  some	  preliminary	  explanation	   and	   conceptual	   untangling.	   The	   section	   of	   SQ	   755	   that	   forbids	   a	   state	  court	   from	   ‘considering	  or	  using	   international	   law’	   reflects	  a	  broader	   conservative	  distrust	  of	  any	  citation	  of	  international	  law	  as	  amounting	  to	  a	  violation	  of	  American	  sovereignty.	  This	  hostility	  is	  seen	  even	  among	  some	  jurists	  themselves.	  For	  example,	  Supreme	  Court	   Justice	  Antonin	   Scalia	   has	   been	   a	   very	   public	   critic	   of	   reference	   to	  foreign	   law	   in	   US	   courts.	   One	   notable	   case	   in	   point	   is	   his	   withering	   dissent	   in	  
Lawrence	  v.	  Texas,	  the	  2003	  Supreme	  Court	  case	  that	  found	  laws	  against	  consensual	  ‘homosexual	  sodomy’	  to	  be	  unconstitutional.	  The	  vote	  in	  that	  landmark	  case	  was	  six	  to	   three.	   Justice	   Scalia	   voted	   in	   the	   minority	   to	   uphold	   anti-­‐sodomy	   statutes.	   His	  dissent	   was	   wide-­‐ranging,	   but	   he	   was	   particularly	   exercised	   by	   the	   majority	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opinion’s	  approving	  reference	  to	  a	  1981	  decision	  by	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  holding	  that	  ‘laws	  proscribing	  [consensual	  homosexual	  conduct]	  were	  invalid	  under	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights’.2	  This	  hostility	  to	  international	  law	  is	  hardly	  some	  quirk	  of	  Justice	  Scalia,	  but	  can	  be	  seen	  also	  in	  the	  US	  Congress’s	  unwillingness	  to	  ratify	  any	  number	  of	  international	  treaties.	   Moreover,	   such	   opposition	   cuts	   across	   simplistic	   partisan	   political	  distinctions	  and	  extends	  a	  long	  tradition	  of	  American	  exceptionalism,	  whose	  shadow	  gives	  cover	  to	  nativist	  suspicions	  of	  ‘foreigners’.	  A	  state	  amendment	  to	  ban	  a	  court’s	  consideration	  of	  foreign	  laws	  could	  probably	  survive	  constitutional	  scrutiny	  and	  be	  upheld	  by	  the	  courts.	   It	   is	   the	  singling	  out	  of	  a	  specific	  religion—Islam—that	  poses	  constitutional	  issues,	  as	  I	  will	  shortly	  argue.	  In	  fact,	  two	  other	  US	  states,	  Tennessee	  and	  Louisiana,	  both	  passed	  more	  neutrally	  worded	   ‘anti-­‐foreign	   law’	  bills	   in	  2010,	  which	   made	   no	   reference	   to	   any	   religion,	   precisely	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   this	   legal	  problem.	   Legalisms	   aside,	   we	   should	   not	   lose	   sight	   of	   the	   ugly	   challenge	   to	  democratic	   values	   posed	   by	   these	   carefully	   worded	   bans	   on	   foreign	   law.	   The	  contemporary	  organised	  movement	   to	  pass	   such	  bans	   is	   in	   fact	   the	   ‘polite’	   face	  of	  what	   is,	   at	   its	   foundation,	   an	  anti-­‐Muslim	  campaign.3	  Whether	  or	  not	   a	   law	  passes	  constitutional	  muster	  does	  not	  tell	  us	  the	  whole	  story.	  Thus,	  even	  as	  I	  do	  address	  the	  constitutional	  dilemmas	  posed	  by	  anti-­‐Shariah	  laws	  below,	  the	  larger	  concern	  of	  this	  essay	  is	  on	  the	  extra-­‐legal	  effects	  of	  such	  bans,	  how	  they	  simultaneously	  illuminate	  and	  animate	  anti-­‐Muslim	  bias	  as	  well	  as	  reveal	  broader	  problems	  raised	  by	  the	  US	  discourse	  of	  tolerance.	  	  
—CHRISTIAN DOMINANCE AND US SECULARISM	  	  As	   of	   this	   writing,	   Oklahoma’s	   ban	   on	   the	   consideration	   of	   Shariah	   law	   and	   any	  foreign	   law	   has	   not	   gone	   into	   effect.	   Within	   days	   of	   the	   measure’s	   passage,	   US	  District	   Judge	  Vicki	  Miles-­‐LaGrange	   granted	   a	   preliminary	   injunction	   against	   State	  Question	   755.	   She	   was	   responding	   to	   a	   lawsuit	   filed	   by	   Muneer	   Awad,	   executive	  director	   of	   the	   Oklahoma	   chapter	   of	   the	   Council	   on	   American–Islamic	   Relations	  (CAIR).	   In	   issuing	   the	   injunction,	   Judge	  Miles-­‐LaGrange	  determined	   that	  Awad	  had	  made	   a	   ‘preliminary	   showing’	   that	   the	   Oklahoma	   amendment	   violated	   the	   First	  Amendment	  to	  the	  US	  Constitution.	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The	   First	   Amendment	   begins:	   ‘Congress	   shall	   make	   no	   law	   respecting	   an	  establishment	  of	  religion,	  or	  prohibiting	  the	  free	  exercise	  thereof’.	  Religious	  freedom	  has	   two	  components:	  disestablishment	  and	   free	  exercise,	  and	  a	   lot	  of	   ink	  has	  been	  spilled	  over	  the	  relation	  between	  these	  two	  aspects	  of	  religious	  freedom:	  how	  they	  are	  related,	  whether	  one	  is	  more	  important	  than	  the	  other	  and	  how	  to	  balance	  their	  principles	  when	  they	  seem	  to	  conflict.	  These	  are	  not	  just	  academic	  questions.	  In	  Love	  
the	  Sin:	  Sexual	  Regulation	  and	  the	  Limits	  of	  Religious	  Freedom,	   Janet	  Jakobsen	  and	  I	  argue	   that	   it	   matters	   a	   great	   deal	   for	   the	   practice	   of	   democratic	   social	   relations	  whether	   one	   sees	   these	   two	   principles	   as	   separable	   or	   interstructuring.4	   Public	  political	  debates	  over	  the	  meaning	  of	  religious	  freedom	  in	  the	  United	  States	  all	   too	  often	  produce	  the	  following	  balkanisation:	  proponents	  of	  more	  religion	  (really,	  more	  Christianity)	   in	  US	  public	   life	   and	   in	   government	   lean	  heavily	   on	   the	   free	   exercise	  component	   and	  underplay	  disestablishment.	   Conversely,	  many	   secularists—not	   all	  secularists,	  to	  be	  sure,	  but	  many—stress	  the	  absolute	  separation	  of	  church	  and	  state	  and	  minimise	  free	  exercise.	   In	  contrast,	   Jakobsen	  and	  I	  see	  disestablishment	  as	  the	  structuring	   condition	   for	   free	   exercise.	   Otherwise,	   those	   who	   are	   religiously	  different	  or	  not	  religious	  at	  all	  may	  well	  find	  their	  lives	  not	  simply	  less	  admired	  and	  valued	   than	   those	  who	   belong	   to	   the	   dominant	   religion;	   they	  may	   find	   they	   have	  diminished	  legal	  status.	  	  Jakobsen	   and	   I	   are	   sympathetic	   to	   those	   who	   are	   nervous	   about	   an	   over-­‐presence	  of	  religion	  in	  American	  public	  life;	  however,	  we	  do	  not	  think	  the	  problem	  is	  religion	  per	  se,	  with	  the	  banishment	  of	  religion	  from	  public	  life	  as	  the	  only	  remedy.	  Rather,	  the	  problem	  is	  one	  of	  social	  dominance.5	  Currently,	  the	  religion	  that	  enjoys	  the	   most	   room	   for	   ‘free	   exercise’	   in	   the	   United	   States	   is	   Christianity.	   Christianity	  offers	   the	  model	   for	  what	   other	   religions	   are	   supposed	   to	   look	   and	   feel	   like,	   such	  that	  even	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  the	  very	  body	  charged	  with	  interpreting	  the	  meaning	  of	   disestablishment	   and	   free	   exercise,	   defaults	   to	   Christian—more	   accurately,	   to	  Reformed	   Protestant—notions	   of	  what	   religion	   ‘is’	   when	   deciding	  whether	   or	   not	  particular	   religious	   rights	   have	   been	   violated.6	   This	   can	   work	   out	   well	   if	   the	  claimants	  belong	   to	  mainline	  Protestant	  denominations,	  but	  not	   so	  well,	   if	   they	  do	  not.	   As	   conservative	   legal	   scholar	   Frederick	   Mark	   Gedicks	   reports,	   ‘No	   Jewish,	  Muslim,	   or	   Native	   American	   plaintiff	   has	   ever	   prevailed	   on	   a	   free	   exercise	   claim	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before	   the	   Supreme	   Court.	   Fundamentalist	   Christians	   and	   sects	   outside	   so-­‐called	  mainline	  Protestantism	  have	  had	  only	  mixed	  success	  in	  seeking	  exemptions.’7	  	  One	   of	   the	   ways	   Christian	   dominance	   works	   is	   that	   particular	   Christian	  practices	  and	  ideals	  can	  ‘float’,	  sometimes	  being	  overtly	  marked	  as	  religious,	  at	  other	  times	   passing	   as	   secular,	   something	   Jakobsen	   and	   I	   have	   referred	   to	   as	   ‘Christo-­‐normativity’.	  Stephen	  M.	  Feldman	  examines	  this	  phenomenon	  as	  it	  has	  played	  out	  in	  a	   string	   of	   Supreme	   Court	   cases	   concerning	   religious	   freedom.	   Because	   ‘Christian	  domination	  is	  so	  deeply	  rooted	  in	  American	  history,’	  he	  argues,	  ‘any	  judicial	  reliance	  on	   tradition	  or	  history	   likely	  will	   result	   in	   the	   constitutional	   approval	   of	   Christian	  practices	   and	   values’.8	   This	   is	   not	   a	  matter	   of	   bad	   faith	   (pun	   intended).	   The	   court	  does	  not	  operate	  in	  a	  vacuum,	  but	  is	  itself	  embedded	  in	  the	  symbols,	  structures	  and	  context	  of	  Christian	  dominance.9	  How	  much	  this	  situation	  will	  change	  now	  that	  there	  are	  three	   Jewish	  members	  of	   the	  Supreme	  Court	  remains	  to	  be	  seen.	   It	  would	  be	  a	  mistake,	   however,	   to	   see	   this	   Christian	   bias	   as	   arising	   from	   any	   one	   individual	  justice’s,	   or	   particular	   group	   of	   justices’,	   blind	   spots.	   The	   problem	   emerges	   from	  institutional	   practices,	   interpretive	   assumptions	   and	   structuring	   conditions,	  which	  reproduce	   Christian	   domination.	   One	   effect	   of	   this	   persistent	   Christian	   bias	   in	  judicial	  decisions—and	  in	  legislative	  policies,	  as	  well—is	  that,	  as	  Feldman	  concludes,	  ‘outgroup	  religions	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  protected	  [from	  discrimination]	  when	  their	  practices	   and	   tenets	   resemble	   those	   of	   Christianity’.10	   But,	   democratic	   freedom	  should	  not	  require	  that	  those	  who	  are	  religiously	  different	  be	  or	  become	  the	  same	  as	  the	   dominant	   norm	   in	   order	   to	   be	   treated	   as	   equals	   before	   the	   law.	   Such	   a	  requirement—to	   become	   like	   or	   like	   enough—significantly	   reduces	   democratic	  social	   space	   not	   just	   for	   being	   different,	   but	   also	   for	   performing,	   enacting,	   one’s	  difference	  in	  public.	  The	  ongoing	  dominance	  of	  Christianity	  and	  its	  default	  status	  as	  the	  measure	  of	  ‘the	  religious’	  have	  produced	  a	  situation	  where	  religious	  difference	  is	  at	  best	  seen	  as	  at	   odds	  with	   American	   identity.	   At	  worst,	   it	   is	   imagined	   to	   be	   an	   actual	   threat	   to	  ‘traditional’	   American	   values,	   where	   ‘traditional’	   means	   Christian,	   but	   can	   be	  stretched	   to	   the	   hyphenated	   ‘Judeo-­‐Christian’	   under	   certain	   circumstances,	   as	   we	  shall	  shortly	  see.	  	  This	   is	   precisely	   the	   dynamic	   playing	   out	   in	   the	   Oklahoma	   amendment.	   If	  enacted,	   the	   amendment	   would	   establish	   a	   class	   of	   religious	   outsiders,	   whose	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religious	   practices	   and	   social	   identities	   are	   afforded	   lesser	   legal	   protections	   and	  public	  status	  than	  their	  religiously	  orthodox	  neighbors.	  In	  its	  preliminary	  injunction,	  the	  district	  court	  found	  that	  the	  amendment	   ‘does	  not	  have	  a	  secular	  purpose,	  that	  its	   primary	   purpose	   inhibits	   religion,	   and	   that	   it	   fosters	   an	   excessive	   government	  entanglement	  with	  religion’.11	  No	  compelling	  state	   interest	  was	  advanced	  to	   justify	  these	   linked	   violations	   of	   the	   Establishment	   Clause.	   Quite	   the	   contrary:	   despite	  claims	   that	  Question	  755	  was	  necessary	   to	   ‘save	  our	   state’,	   proponents	   of	   the	   law	  could	   not	   point	   to	   any	   concrete	   instances	   where	   Shariah	   law	   actually	   had	   been	  imposed	  on	  Oklahoma	   citizens,	   let	   alone	  by	   the	   courts.	   In	   the	  preliminary	  hearing	  conducted	  by	  the	  district	  court	  immediately	  after	  voter	  passage	  of	  the	  amendment,	  Scott	  Boughton,	  an	  assistant	  attorney	  general	  for	  the	  state,	  conceded	  that	  he	  knew	  of	  no	  cases	   in	  which	  Oklahoma	  courts	  had	   in	   fact	   invoked	  Shariah	   law.	  And	  yet,	   facts	  were	  apparently	  no	  obstacle,	  for	  he	  persisted	  in	  defending	  the	  law	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  state.	  Muslims	  are	  a	  slim	  minority	  in	  Oklahoma:	  30,000	  of	  a	  total	  state	  population	  of	  3.7	  million.	  However,	  who	  needs	  actual	  Muslims	  when	  you	  have	  the	  potent	  figure	  of	  ‘the	  Muslim’,	  an	  all-­‐purpose	  bogeyman	  for	  the	  American	  twenty-­‐first	  century?12	  And	  the	  dangerous	  Muslim	  conjured	  by	  the	  US	  political	  imaginary	  is	  almost	  always	  male;	  when	  Muslim	  women	  do	  appear,	  they	  do	  so	  veiled	  and	  victimised—by	  Muslim	  men	  and	  Shariah	  law.	  Fearmongering	   rhetoric	   notwithstanding,	   the	   Caliphate	   is	   not	   coming	   to	  Oklahoma	   any	   time	   soon,	   or	   anywhere	   else	   in	   the	   US	   for	   that	   matter.	   But	   the	  Oklahoma	  amendment,	   if	  enacted,	  would	  have	  a	  chilling	  effect	  on	   the	   free	  exercise	  rights	  of	  Muslims	  in	  that	  state.	  As	  law	  professor	  Aziz	  Huq	  explained	  in	  the	  New	  York	  
Times:	  A	  butcher	  would	  no	  longer	  be	  able	  to	  enforce	  his	  contract	  for	  halal	  meat—	  contracts	   that,	   like	   deals	   for	   kosher	   or	   other	   faith-­‐sanctioned	   foods,	   are	  regularly	   enforced	   around	   the	   country.	   Nor	   could	   a	  Muslim	   banker	   seek	  damages	   for	   violations	   of	   a	   financial	   instrument	   certified	   as	   ‘Sharia	  compliant’	  since	  it	  pays	  no	  interest.13	  	  This	   burden	   on	   free	   exercise	   thus	   violates	   the	   second	   component	   of	   First	  Amendment	  religious	  freedom.	  To	  its	  credit,	  the	  Oklahoma	  district	  court	  did	  not	  pull	  its	   punches	   in	   identifying	   the	   anti-­‐Muslim	   bias	   animating	   the	   amendment:	   the	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‘amendment	   is	  not	   facially	  neutral,	  discriminates	  against	  a	   specific	   religious	  belief,	  and	  prohibits	  conduct	  because	  it	  is	  undertaken	  for	  religious	  reasons’.14	  	  
—THE FRAME OF DIFFERENCE: INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS TO THE NATION Most	   legal	   analysts	   agree	   that	   the	   district	   court’s	   injunction	   will	   likely	   become	  permanent	  and	  will	  survive	  appeal.	  The	  anti-­‐Shariah	  amendment	  is	  dead,	  for	  now,	  in	  the	   state	   of	   Oklahoma.	  More	   than	   legal	   prohibitions	   are	   at	   stake,	   however.	   A	   law	  does	  not	  have	  to	  be	  enforced	  to	  have	  profoundly	  shaping	  effects	  on	  public	  debates	  over	   insiders	   and	   outsiders	   to	   the	   nation.	   Legislators	   in	   six	   other	   states	   are	  considering	  similarly	  worded	  bans	  on	  Shariah	  law	  and,	  as	  Huq	  reports,	  many	  more	  (fourteen	  at	  this	  counting)	  are	  considering	  wider	  bans	  on	  use	  of	   ‘foreign	  laws’.	  The	  public	   language	   used	   in	   these	   debates	   contributes	   to	   an	   atmosphere	   in	   which	  ‘Muslim-­‐Oklahoman’	   or,	   simply,	   ‘Muslim-­‐American’	   is	   an	   impossible	   identity.	   For	  example,	   in	   a	   June	   2010	   interview	  with	   ABC	   News	   (US),	   state	   representative	   Rex	  Duncan,	  chair	  of	  Oklahoma’s	  House	  Judiciary	  Committee	  and	  an	  author	  of	  the	  anti-­‐Shariah	   amendment,	   used	   a	  meteorological	  metaphor	   to	   explain	   the	   vital	   need	   for	  the	  law:	  ‘It’s	  not	  an	  imminent	  threat	  in	  Oklahoma	  yet,	  but	  it’s	  a	  storm	  on	  the	  horizon	  in	  other	  states.’15	  Subsequently,	  in	  an	  interview	  with	  cable	  news	  channel	  MSNBC,	  he	  turned	  to	  military	  metaphors	  to	  describe	  the	  amendment	  as	  a	  ‘a	  war	  for	  the	  survival	  of	  America’	  and	  ‘a	  pre-­‐emptive	  strike’	  against	  Islamic	  law	  and	  against	  ‘liberal	  judges’	  who	  want	   to	  undermine	  America’s	   ‘founding	  principles’.16	  By	   ‘founding	  principles’,	  though,	   Duncan	   did	   not	   mean	   the	   Constitution.	   ‘Oklahomans’,	   he	   continued,	  ‘recognize	   that	   America	   was	   founded	   on	   Judeo-­‐Christian	   principles.’	   It	   is	   these	  values	  the	  amendment	  defends,	  to	  ensure	  ‘that	  our	  courts	  are	  not	  used	  to	  undermine	  those	   founding	   principles,	   and	   turn	   Oklahoma	   into	   something	   that	   our	   founding	  fathers	  and	  our	  great	  grandparents	  wouldn't	  recognize’.	  	  In	   this	   rhetorical	   circuit,	   Duncan	   ties	   a	   knot	   between	   America	   and	   particular	  religious	  values	  (‘Judeo-­‐Christian’)	  and	  links	  social	  recognition	  to	  a	  matter	  of	  family	  resemblance:	   what	   ‘our	   founding	   fathers	   and	   our	   great	   grandparents’	   would	   or	  would	   not	   recognise.	   The	   conjoined	   language	   of	   family	   and	   of	   self-­‐defence—Save	  
Our	   State—recodes	   the	   amendment.	  To	   its	   legislative	  backers,	   like	  Duncan,	   and	   to	  the	  overwhelming	  number	  of	  Oklahomans	  who	  voted	  for	  it,	  State	  Question	  755	  was	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not	  about	  discrimination	  against	  Muslims.17	   It	  was	  about	  defending	  core	  American	  principles.	  And	  who’d	  be	  against	  that,	  except	  those	  who	  are	  un-­‐	  or	  anti-­‐American?	  The	  dense	  network	  of	  ties	  spun	  by	  Duncan—nation	  =	  Judeo-­Christian	  =	  family—produces	  powerful	  affective	  resonances	  across	  ideological	  and	  creedal	  affiliations.18	  The	  addition	  of	  ‘Judeo’	  is	  important	  here,	  as	  it	  further	  cements	  the	  notion	  that	  State	  Question	  755	  is	  not	  religiously	  discriminatory.	  First,	  the	  hyphenate	  ‘Judeo-­‐Christian’	  posits	   a	   false	   identity	   and	   equality	   between	   Judaism	   and	  Christianity.19	   Second,	   in	  the	   specific	   context	   of	   public	   debates	   over	   the	   place	   of	   Muslims	   in	   American	   life,	  ‘Judeo-­‐Christian’	   effectively	   triangulates	   two	   groups	   of	   religious	   outsiders—American	   Jews	   and	   American	   Muslims—identifying	   the	   former	   as	   manifesting	   an	  acceptable	  form	  of	  religious	  difference,	  and	  setting	  the	  latter	  outside	  the	  boundaries	  of	  national	  belonging.	  	  As	   Jakobsen	   and	   I	   argue	   in	   Love	   the	   Sin,	   such	   acts	   of	   naming	   are	   part	   of	   the	  process	  by	  which	  the	  lines	  between	  who	  belongs	  and	  who	  does	  not	  are	  drawn	  and	  reinforced.20	  Public	  discourse,	  how	  we	  talk	  about	  and	  frame	  debates	  over	  difference,	  matters;	  it	  materialises.	  Indeed,	  how	  we	  talk	  about	  and	  name	  ‘others’	  can	  turn	  social	  difference,	  which	  is	  not	  or	  need	  not	  be	  a	  problem,	  into	  social	  division,	  which	  is.	  This	  is	   not	   a	   recent	   dilemma,	   and	   tolerance	   is	   not	   the	   solution.	   Robust	   democratic	  engagement	   that	  widens	   the	   space	   for	  difference,	   rather	   than	   requiring	   those	  who	  are	  different	  to	  become	  more	  of	  the	  same,	  is.	  
—WHAT THE CENTRE CANNOT HOLD In	  The	   Citizen	  Machine:	   Governing	   by	   Television	   in	   1950s	   America,	   Anna	  McCarthy	  analyses	  the	  emergence	  of	   television	  as	  a	   technology	  of	  national	  belonging,	   tracing	  how	   corporations,	   non-­‐profit	   foundations,	   intellectuals,	   and	   politicians	   variously	  sought	   to	   use	   the	   new	   medium	   to	   teach	   citizens	   how	   to	   properly	   engage	   in	  democratic	   life	   in	   the	   United	   States	   during	   the	   Cold	   War.21	   One	   of	   the	   things	  McCarthy	   illuminates	   is	   how	   a	   centrist	   language	   of	   balance	   and	   moderation	   was	  deployed	   by	   both	   conservatives	   and	   liberals	   to	   discredit	   opposing	   positions	   as	  ‘extremist’	   and	  over	   the	   line.	  Of	   course,	  not	   every	   individual	  or	  group	  was	  equally	  positioned	  to	  have	  its	  appeals	  to	  centrism	  credited.	  In	  practice,	  the	  language	  of	  the	  centre	  was	  also	  a	  vocabulary	  of	  marginalisation	  that	  secured	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  general	  public	  by	  relegating	  some	  subjects	  to	  its	  outside.	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In	   one	   especially	   telling	   incident,	   McCarthy	   recounts	   President	   Dwight	   D.	  Eisenhower’s	   refusal	   to	   meet	   with	   civil	   rights	   leaders	   after	   Brown	   v.	   Board	   of	  
Education.	   In	   that	   landmark	   1954	   case,	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   held	   that	   the	   racial	  segregation	  of	  public	   schools	  was	  unconstitutional,	   effectively	  ending	   separate	  but	  equal	   as	  a	  matter	  of	   law.22	  How	  well	   this	  mandate	  was	   carried	  out	   in	  practice	   is	   a	  separate	   issue,	   especially	   in	   light	  of	   the	  court’s	   language	   in	  a	   follow-­‐up	  hearing,	   in	  1955,	   to	   determine	   how	   the	   desegregation	   should	   be	   achieved:	   namely,	   ‘with	   all	  deliberate	   speed’.	   This	   ambiguous	   language	   was	   used	   by	   opponents	   of	  desegregation	  to	  delay	  implementation	  of	  the	  new	  policy.	  	  For	  his	  part,	  Eisenhower	  justified	  his	  refusal	  to	  meet	  with	  civil	  rights	  leaders	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  if	  he	  met	  with	  them	  he	  would	  also	  have	  to	  meet	  with	  the	  Ku	  Klux	  Klan,	   a	   logic	   that	   effectively	   equated	   peaceful	   activists	   for	   racial	   equality	   with	   an	  organisation	  dedicated	  to	  the	  violent	  suppression	  of	  racial	  and	  religious	  minorities.	  This	   equation	   was	   utterly	   of	   its	   moment,	   however.	   As	   McCarthy	   underlines,	  Eisenhower’s	  appeals	  to	  balance	  and	  moderation	  were	  of	  a	  piece	  with	  broader	  Cold	  War	   attempts	   to	   cultivate	   a	   democratic	   citizenry	   that	   was	   engaged,	   but	   not	  ‘extremist’.	   (Cue	  Oklahoma’s	   ‘Oh,	   the	   farmer	   and	   the	   cowman	   should	   be	   friends	  …	  territory	   folks	  should	  stick	  together,	   territory	   folks	  should	  all	  be	  pals’.)	  Within	  this	  logic,	   ‘extremist’	   meant	   ‘activist’,	   a	   logic	   of	   equivalence	   that	   actually	   promoted	  inequality.	  How	  so?	  This	  equation	  made	  it	  impossible	  to	  make	  important	  moral	  and	  political	   distinctions	  between	   advocates	   of	   freedom	  and	   equality	   and	   advocates	   of	  hateful	  violence.	  In	  Love	  the	  Sin,	   Jakobsen	  and	  I	  discuss	  this	  reductionist	  logic	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  structure	  of	   tolerance.	  To	  be	   tolerant	   is	   to	  be	   ‘fair	  and	  balanced’—and	  that	  sounds	  pretty	   good,	   right?	   Nevertheless,	   we	   have	   to	   ask,	   fair	   and	   balanced	   as	   seen	   from	  where	  or	   from	  whose	  point	  of	  view?	  Although	  American	  commonsense	  prizes	  and	  seeks	  to	  cultivate	  tolerance	  as	  a	  response	  to	  violence	  and	  social	  division,	  in	  practice,	  tolerance	   works	   to	   affirm	   existing	   social	   hierarchies	   by	   establishing	   an	   us–them	  relationship	   between	   a	   dominant	   centre	   and	   those	   on	   the	   margins.	   Us–them	  commonly	   triangulates,	   as	   when	   a	   dominant	   centre	   (also	   known	   as	   the	   phantom	  ‘general	   public’)	   distinguishes	   itself	   from—and	  morally	   elevates	   itself	   above—two	  equally	   ‘extremist’	   others.	   This	   is	   the	   dynamic	   at	   work	   in	   Eisenhower’s	   ‘inertial	  stance	   on	   racial	   equality’	   (to	   use	   McCarthy’s	   language).	   This	   stance	   stakes	   out	   a	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middle	  ground	  in	  which	  a	  dominant	  white	  majority	  need	  not	  move	  the	  boundaries	  of	  national	  belonging	  at	  all	  or,	  at	  least,	  can	  cede	  as	  little	  ground	  as	  slowly	  as	  possible.	  When	  the	  rhetoric	  of	   ‘fair	  and	  balanced’	  meets	   ‘with	  all	  deliberate	  speed’,	  expect	  a	  stall.	  ‘Fair	   and	   balanced’	   is	   also	   the	   self-­‐serving	   (and	   trademarked)	   slogan	   of	   Fox	  News,	  which	  is	  part	  of	  Rupert	  Murdoch’s	  News	  Corporation.	  Fox’s	  claims	  to	  be	  ‘fair	  and	  balanced’	  have	  been	  extensively	   challenged	  by	  media	  watchdogs	   like	  Fairness	  and	   Accuracy	   in	   Reporting,	   but	   without	   seeming	   to	   dent	   the	   news	   network’s	  popularity.	   If	   anything,	   attacks	   from	   the	   left	   only	   embolden	   Fox’s	   claims	   to	   be	  speaking	   for	   ‘real’	   American	   values.	   And	   real	   American	   values	   continue	   to	   speak	  from	   and	   to	   an	   imagined	   centre,	   from	   President	   Barack	   Obama’s	   much-­‐repeated	  hopes	   of	   rising	   above	   partisanship,	   to	   comedian	   Jon	   Stewart’s	   ‘call-­‐to-­‐reasonableness’	   via	   his	   October	   2010	   national	   ‘Rally	   to	   Restore	   Sanity’,	   to	   the	  American	   media’s	   two	   sides	   to	   every	   story	   approach	   to	   complex	   social	  controversies.	   I	  want	   to	   be	   clear	   that	   I	   am	  not	   against	   ‘reasonableness’	  per	   se.	  My	  concern	  here	   is	  with	   the	  way	  such	  appeals	  actually	   function	   in	   the	  storm	  of	  public	  debates	  over	  the	  boundaries	  of	  US	  public	  life.	  This	  is	  a	  rather	  different	  ‘storm’	  from	  the	  one	  Duncan	  worries	  over.	  Reasonableness	  or	  rationality	  can	  also	  work	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  its	  ostensible	  opposite:	  a	  mobilisation	  of	  public	  feelings.	  
—PUBLIC FEELINGS AND THE RHETORIC OF REASONABLENESS Consider	   in	   this	   regard	   the	   intensely	   mediatised	   political	   tempest	   over	   Cordoba	  House,	   the	   proposed	   Islamic	   centre	   in	   downtown	   Manhattan.	   This	   project	   has	  become	   (un)popularly	   known	   as	   the	   ‘Ground	   Zero	  Mosque’—an	   act	   of	  misnaming	  that	   stuck	   and	   has	   powered	  much	   of	   the	   controversy	   over	   the	   proposed	   building.	  The	   language	   of	   reasonableness	   may	   sound	   softer	   and	   kinder	   than	   the	   blatant	  Islamaphobia	  of	  many	  of	  the	  project’s	  opponents,	  but	  it	  amounts	  to	  much	  the	  same	  thing:	   narrowing	   the	   social	   space	   available	   to	   be	   and	   ‘do’	   difference	   in	   public.	  Wading	   into	   the	   controversy,	   President	   Obama	   spoke	   the	   language	   of	   reason	   and	  constitutional	  history	  when	  he	  declared:	  	  Muslims	   have	   the	   same	   right	   to	   practice	   their	   religion	   as	   anyone	   else	   in	  this	   country.	   That	   includes	   the	   right	   to	   build	   a	   place	   of	   worship	   and	   a	  community	  center	  on	  private	  property	  in	  lower	  Manhattan,	  in	  accordance	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with	   local	   laws	  and	  ordinances.	  This	   is	  America,	   and	  our	   commitment	   to	  religious	   freedom	  must	   be	   unshakeable.	   The	   principle	   that	   people	   of	   all	  faiths	   are	  welcome	   in	   this	   country,	   and	  will	  not	  be	   treated	  differently	  by	  their	   government,	   is	   essential	   to	   who	  we	   are.	   The	  writ	   of	   our	   Founders	  must	  endure.23	  Obama	   made	   these	   comments	   in	   August	   2010,	   at	   an	   official	   White	   House	   event	  celebrating	   Ramadan,	   a	  White	   House	   tradition	   of	   hosting	   an	   Iftar	  meal	   that	   went	  back	   several	   years	   and	   was	   akin	   to	   the	   way	   the	   White	   House	   hosted	   ‘Christmas	  parties,	  seders,	  and	  Diwali	  celebrations’.	   In	  what	  may	  at	  first	  seem	  like	  an	  aside,	   in	  his	  prepared	  remarks	  the	  President	  mentioned	  that	  he	  is	  not	  the	  first	  US	  president	  to	   host	   a	   dinner	   celebrating	   a	   Muslim	   holiday.	   However,	   this	   is	   more	   than	   an	  historical	   footnote,	  given	  the	  significant	  percentage	  of	  Americans	  who	  suspect	   that	  President	   Barack	   Hussein	   Obama	   is	   himself	   a	   secret	   Muslim.	   In	   any	   case,	   neither	  Obama’s	   remarks	   nor	   its	   careful	   packaging	   did	   anything	   to	   tamp	   down	   the	  controversy	  over	  the	  Cordoba	  House	  project.	  Just	   the	   opposite.	   His	   remarks	   immediately	   drew	   fire	   from	   opponents	   of	  Cordoba	  House.	  The	  comments	  of	  Congressman	  Peter	  T.	  King,	  a	  Republican	  from	  the	  state	   of	   New	   York,	   were	   typical	   of	   the	   more	   ‘moderate’	   criticisms	   the	   President	  received:	  	  President	  Obama	   is	  wrong.	   It	   is	   insensitive	   and	   uncaring	   for	   the	  Muslim	  community	   to	   build	   a	  mosque	   in	   the	   shadow	   of	   Ground	   Zero.	  While	   the	  Muslim	  community	  has	  the	  right	  to	  build	  the	  mosque	  they	  are	  abusing	  that	  right	  by	  needlessly	  offending	  so	  many	  people	  who	  have	  suffered	  so	  much.	  The	  right	  and	  moral	  thing	  for	  President	  Obama	  to	  have	  done	  was	  to	  urge	  Muslim	   leaders	   to	   respect	   the	   families	  of	   those	  who	  died	  and	  move	   their	  mosque	   away	   from	  Ground	   Zero.	  Unfortunately	   the	   President	   caved	   into	  political	  correctness.24	  In	   response	   to	   such	   criticisms,	   and	   worrying	   about	   anticipated	   Democratic	   Party	  losses	   (and	   they	  did	   lose	  big)	   in	   the	  November	  2010	  midterm	  elections	   (the	   same	  elections	  in	  which	  Oklahoma	  voters	  passed	  the	  ban	  on	  Shariah),	  on	  14	  August,	  just	  a	  day	   after	   his	   rousing	   remarks	   at	   the	   White	   House	   event,	   Obama	   clarified	   his	  meaning:	   ‘My	   intention	  was	   simply	   to	   let	   people	   know	  what	   I	   thought,	  which	  was	  that	   in	   this	   country,	   we	   treat	   everybody	   equally	   and	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   law,	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regardless	   of	   race,	   regardless	   of	   religion.	   I	   was	   not	   commenting	   and	   I	   will	   not	  comment	  on	  the	  wisdom	  of	  making	  the	  decision	  to	  put	  a	  mosque	  there.’25	  In	  both	  King’s	   criticism	  and	  Obama’s	  dancing	  on	  a	  pin	   response,	  we	  see	  what	  happens	  when	  a	  call	  to	  reasonableness	  meets	  up	  with	  appeals	  to	  public	  feelings:	  the	  feelings	  of	   some	  people	  must	  be	  protected,	   even	   if	   that	  means	   running	   roughshod	  over	  the	  rights	  of	  some	  others.	  This	  is	  so	  because	  such	  debates	  are	  conducted	  under	  conditions	  of	  dominance	  in	  which	  some	  positions	  are	  staked	  out	  from	  the	  beginning	  as	  the	  mark	  and	  measure	  of	  both	  reason	  and	  reasonable	  emotional	  response.	  If	  some	  Muslims	  come	  away	  with	  hurt	  feelings,	  or	  even	  limited	  free	  exercise	  rights	  (as	  would	  be	  the	  result	   if	  Oklahoma’s	  anti-­‐Shariah	  amendment	  were	  enacted),	   that	   is	   just	  the	  price	  they	  must	  pay	  for	  (eventual?)	  acceptance.	  Tolerance	  in	  this	  context	  supports	  anti-­‐Muslim	  bias	  and	  ‘Christo-­‐normativity’	  in	  the	  public	  square.	  Tolerance,	  as	  Jakobsen	  and	  I	  argue	  at	  length	  in	  Love	  the	  Sin,	   is	  in	  many	   respects	   a	   secular	   version	   of	   religious	   toleration	   in	   which	   an	   established	  church	   allows	   dissenters	   the	   right	   to	   worship	   without	   fear	   of	   persecution,	   but	  withholds	   from	   them	  equivalent	  public	  or	   civic	   rights	  and	  privileges.	  Although	   the	  United	   States	   is	   formally	   secular—again,	   the	   First	   Amendment	   promises	  disestablishment	   and	   free	   exercise	   of	   religion—Christianity	   (Reformed	  Protestantism)	   has	   long	   functioned	   as	   the	   backdrop	   against	   which	   claims	   to	   be	   a	  moral	  person	  or	  have	  values	  achieve	  cultural	  legibility.	  To	  put	  this	  another	  way,	  the	  Christian	  assumptions	  underlying	  tolerance	  may	  also	  help	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  why	  the	  anti-­‐Muslim	  feelings	  animating	  public	  debates	  over	  Cordoba	  House	  are	  not	  seen	  or	  experienced	   as	   prejudice—at	   least	   not	   from	   the	   standpoint	   of	   the	   tolerant	   centre.	  For	   those	   on	   the	   margins	   of	   US	   national	   belonging,	   the	   receiving	   end	   of	   such	  tolerance	  may	  not	  feel	  so	  good.	  In	   the	  controversy	  over	   the	   ‘Ground	  Zero	  Mosque’,	  Muslim	  Americans	  are	  not	  being	  formally	  excluded	  by	  a	  democratic	  majority,	  as	  they	  were	  by	  Oklahoma	  voters.	  Rather,	   they	   are	   being	   asked	   (albeit	   not	   so	   politely)	   to	   subordinate	   their	   free	  exercise	   rights	   under	   the	   First	   Amendment	   to	   the	   hurt	   feelings	   of	   the	   rest	   of	  America;	   they	  are	  also	  being	  called	  upon	   to	   identify	  with	   the	  dominant	  centre—to	  feel	  its	  pain	  as	  their	  own.	  This	  set	  of	  substitutions	  assumes	  that	  Muslim-­‐Americans	  are	  not	  already	  part	  of	   the	  United	  States	  and	  also	   reveals	   just	  how	   limited	  are	   the	  boundaries	  of	  moderation,	  fairness,	  and	  tolerance.	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—CONCLUDING NOTES The	  frame	  of	  tolerance—the	  way	  it	  legitimates	  some	  actors	  and	  their	  public	  feelings	  even	   as	   it	   delegitimates	   some	   others—can	   also	   help	   make	   sense	   of	   the	   morally	  stupefying	  equivalence	  some	  political	  pundits	  and	  media	  outlets	  in	  the	  United	  States	  made	   between	   evangelical	   Pastor	   Terry	   Jones’s	   announced	   ‘International	   Burn	   a	  Koran	  Day’,	  which	  was	  timed	  to	  coincide	  with	  the	  ninth	  anniversary	  of	  9/11,	  and	  the	  planned	  Cordoba	  Center.	  Both	  came	  to	  be	  represented	  as	  actions	   that	  were	  within	  the	   First	   Amendment	   rights	   of	   the	   groups	   proposing	   them	   but	   which	   would	   be	  ‘hurtful’.	   As	  with	  Eisenhower’s	   refusal	   to	  meet	  with	   civil	   rights	   leaders	  more	   than	  sixty	  years	  ago,	  once	  again	  we	  see	  how	  inadequate	  ‘moderating’	  notions	  like	  fair	  and	  balanced	   are	   to	   making	   crucial	   moral	   distinctions	   and	   creating	   more	   democratic	  social	  space	  for	  being	  different	  and	  ‘doing’	  difference.	  	  In	  the	  song	  with	  which	  I	  began	  this	  essay,	  the	  hero	  of	  Oklahoma	  proclaims	  his	  ‘beautiful	   feelin’	   that	   everything’s	   goin’	  my	  way’.	   Democracy,	   however,	   is	   not	   only	  about	  beautiful	   feelings	  and	  having	  things	  your	  way.	  This	   is	  among	  the	  reasons	  we	  need	   courts	   to	   protect	   the	   rights	   of	   unpopular	   minorities	   from	   the	   sentiments	   of	  majority	   rules.	   However,	   law	   is	   not	   the	   only	   forum,	   and	   certainly	   not	   the	   most	  common	  one,	  for	  democratic	  engagement	  with	  difference.	  In	  everyday	  life,	  we	  bump	  up	   against	   each	   other	   and	   may	   well	   be	   discomforted	   by	   differences	   we	   cannot	  assimilate	  or	  will	  not	  understand.	  But	  difference	  is	  not	  a	  problem	  or	  ‘the’	  problem	  to	  get	  over.	   It	   is	  rather	  the	  very	  material	  of	  our	   lives	  with	  others,	  and	  the	  democratic	  worlds	  we	  may	  yet	  make.	   —	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